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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

GARY LAMONT SORENSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20020964-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appeals from an order refusing to bind over and dismissing an information
charging defendant with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and possession or use of morphine and methamphetamine. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
Did the preliminary hearing magistrate err in refusing to bind over possession charges
where the evidence established that: (1) pursuant to a search warrant, the police discovered
in defendant's bedroom in his home: measuring scales, a metric weight set for checking the
accuracy of the scales, Ziplock bags with traces of methamphetamine, spoons with
methamphetamine residue, syringes with methamphetamine residue, and propane torches,

(2) the scales and packaging materials found in defendant's bedroom were "consistent" with
illegal drug sales, (3) defendant's Day Planner left in the same bedroom contained "pay
sheets," used to record drug sales, (4) defendant spent the night prior to the search in the
home and left only a few hours before the search warrant was executed, (5) defendant was
on probation for possession and distribution of controlled substances, (6) twelve days after
the search, defendant's urine tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine?
Whether probable cause exists to support a bindover presents a question of law which
is reviewed on appeal for correctness. State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, % 8, 44 P.3d 730
(citing State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, fl 8 & 15-16,20 P.3d 300); State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,
44 (Utah App. 1995). The State preserved the issue at R. 17-21 and R. 39: 60-74.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-2(dd) (2002) is determinative:

"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control,
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application,
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have
individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if
it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the
use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the activity
was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or under
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it.
This and any other provision cited in the body of this brief are reproduced in Addendum A.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 21, 2002, defendant was charged with:
Count I - Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a second
degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2002), occurring on
August 8, 2002;
Count II - Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (2002), occurring on August 8,
2002;1
Count III'- Possession or Use of Morphine, a third degree felony, in violation
of section 58-37-8, occurring on August 20, 2002;
Count IV- Possession or Use of Methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in
violation of section 58-37-8, occurring on August 20,2002;
Count V - Interference with Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (1999), occurring on August 20,
2002.
(R. 1-3, 12-13). Following preliminary hearing, the magistrate refused to bind defendant
over and dismissed Counts I-IV (R. 15-16, 25-27). According to the magistrate, probable
cause did not support the possession charges because the State failed to establish defendant's
actual or constructive possession of the drugs and paraphernalia found in defendant's home
(R. 25-27, 29-30; R.39: 73-74). The remaining charge of interference (Count V) was
dismissed with prejudice upon motion of the State (R. 29-30). On November 6, 2002, the
State timely appealed the refusal to bind over and dismissal of Counts I-IV (R. 31-33).

1

The information lists Count II as a violation of section 58-37a-8 (R. 2). This
appears to be a typographical error as no such section exists; possession of drug
paraphernalia is prohibited in section 58-37a-5. See Addendum A.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS2
In April 2001, defendant was placed on supervised probation following convictions
for third-degree felony possession of a controlled substance and second-degree felony
distribution of a controlled substance (R. 39: 30). As required, defendant listed his legal
residence with Adult Probation and Parole; the residence was a three-bedroom trailer located
at 660 South 600 East, Mount Pleasant, Utah (R. 39: 8,13,25). The trailer was within 1000
feet of a high school (R. 39: 12).
A Mount Pleasant City police officer lived across the street (R. 39:9). In June 2002,
the officer reported that defendant's trailer was receiving a lot of short term traffic indicative
of illegal drug sales (id.). Based on this information, members of the Central Utah Narcotics
Task Force maintained periodic drive-by surveillance of defendant's trailer (R. 39: 8-9).
On August 7,2002, defendant spent the night at his trailer (R. 39:32). The next day,
August 8, defendant left the trailer around 6:30 p.m. (R. 39:16,22,31). Approximately three
hours later, the police, accompanied by a probation officer, entered the trailer pursuant to a
search warrant (id.).3 The only person inside was defendant's ex-wife, who confirmed that
the trailer was defendant's residence and said that for the last 5-7 days, she was staying at the
trailer with defendant's permission (R. 39: 13,21-22,32). The ex-wife explained that she

2

The preliminary hearing facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. See Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,' \ 10; State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, H 3, 26
P.3d 223 (both citing State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,438 (Utah 1998)).
3

A defendant may not challenge a search warrant at a preliminary hearing. See
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7((h)(2) (Addendum A). Consequently, no issue relating to the validity
of the search is at issue in this appeal.
4

and her son used one bedroom, the son's friend used another, and defendant slept in the
master bedroom (R. 39: 13, 26-27, 32).
The police found drug residue and drug paraphernalia in each of the three bedrooms
and in the trailer's common bathroom (R. 39: 13-14, 18-20, 27-28).
In the master bedroom, defendant's bedroom, syringes and spoons with
methamphetamine residue were discovered (R. 39: 12,19-20). One spoon was on the night
stand next to his bed; the other was in a "cubby hold" of the bed's headboard or in a nearby
dresser drawer (R. 39: 19, 31). "[Different sets of scales," "propane torches, lighters,...
a metric set that checks the accuracy of your scales, [and] [Zjiplock bags'.' containing traces
ofmethamphetamine were also discovered in the room (R. 39:12,13-14,20,28.30-31). The
packaging and scales were "consistent" with drug distribution (R. 39: 14, 30-31).
Additionally, defendant's Day Planner was on the bed or dresser (R. 39: 13,27). Inside the
Planner was defendant's Social Security card and "pay sheets," typically used to record drug
sales, with "a lot of names with amounts owing" written in columns (R. 39: 13,28-29, 31).4
A warrant for defendant's arrest was obtained (R. 39: 10-11, 35-36). Twelve days
later, on August 20, 2002, the police located defendant at the same trailer (id.). They told
defendant they had an arrest warrant and asked him to come out of the trailer (R. 39: 37-40,
44, 46-47). When he did not, the police entered and found defendant locked in the master
bedroom (R. 39: 40-41-42, 48-49). They arrested and transported him to jail (R. 39: 43).
4

Other items found in the master bedroom confirmed that the room was occupied
by defendant, including male clothing, business receipts in defendant's name, "a lot of
paperwork" bearing defendant's name, and some prescription bottles with his name (R.
39: 27, 33-34).
5

At the jail, defendant voluntarily provided a urine specimen (id.). The specimen
tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine (id.). Defendant told the police that he
had a prescription for Lortab (morphine) at home (R. 39: 45, 51-52).5
Defendant was charged with possession of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia
discovered in his bedroom on August 8 (Counts I & II) and the possession or use of
methamphetamine and morphine based on the urine analysis on August 20 (Counts III & IV)
(R. 1-3, 12-13).6
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate opined that probable
cause did not support a bindover on the possession charges (R. 26). According to the
magistrate, "possession" requires actual and exclusive control, but here defendant lived with
others and was not present during the August 8th search (R. 39: 60-61, 68-69). The
magistrate asked what "constructive possession" meant and asked the prosecutor if
"something . . . says that possessing, even though you're miles away, is sufficient" (R. 39:
68-69). The magistrate was skeptical because "all the cases I know of seem to me to say

5

The probation officer who participated in the August 8th search testified that he
found prescription bottles for some narcotic, possibly Lortab (also referred to as Loritab),
in defendant's bedroom (R. 39: 33-34). No evidence was presented concerning the
validity or date of the prescriptions, the precise drugs prescribed, or if the bottles
discovered in the bedroom even contained any pills. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-377(5)(b) & 58-37-15(1) & (2) (2002) (placing the burden on the defendant to establish that
his possession or use of a controlled substance is pursuant to a valid prescription)
(Addendum A).
6

Defendant was also charged with interference with arresting officer, a class B
misdemeanor (Count V). After the magistrate refused to bind over Counts I-IV, the State
moved to dismiss Count V with prejudice; the motion was granted (R. 24, 29-30).
Therefore, the interference charge is not at issue on appeal.
6

you've got [to have] the ability to reach out and touch something if you're gonna [sic] be
guilty of possession" (R. 39: 68-69, 74). With the magistrate's permission, the prosecutor
submitted a memorandum on constructive possession (R. 17-21), but the magistrate
nevertheless continued to refuse to bind over because, according to the magistrate,
[t]here was no evidence to show that the defendant was engaged in the
criminal enterprise of possession or use of a controlled substance. The
defendant made no incriminating statements. He was not close to the drugs
because he was not present. There was no evidence showing that he was
participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug
paraphernalia.
(R. 26) (Addendum B).

The magistrate dismissed the felony drug possession and

misdemeanor paraphernalia charges based on the August 8th search (Counts I & II), and
without further explanation, dismissed the felony drug possession/use charges based on the
August 20th urine analysis (R. 25-27 & 29-30) (Addendum B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to applicable standards, the magistrate failed to view the preliminary hearing
evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the information.
Similarly, the magistrate failed to distinguish between the low level of evidentiary proof
necessary for bindover (probable cause/believable evidence) and the high level of proof
necessary for conviction (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
Additionally, the magistrate erred in interpreting the elements of possession of a
controlled substance and/or drug paraphernalia. Contrary to the magistrate's ruling, proof
of actual physical possession of the prohibited substance or object is not required, nor is
proof of a defendant's exclusive control. Instead, a defendant may legally "possess" an
7

object when there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the object to support a
factual inference that the he had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over
it.
Here, the evidence readily supports that nexus. Because probable cause supports the
charges, the magistrate had no legal basis to refuse to bind over or to dismiss the information.
ARGUMENT
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES; THEREFORE,
THE MAGISTRATE HAD NO LEGAL BASIS TO REFUSE TO BIND
OVER OR TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION
In refusing to bind over and dismissing the information, the magistrate (1) failed to
apply the proper evidentiary and legal standards governing preliminary hearings, (2) failed
to interpret the legal requirements for "possession," and (3) failed to factually distinguish
between the August 8th and 20th offenses. When the preliminary hearing evidence is correctly
assessed, it is clear that probable cause supports the information and, therefore, bindover is
mandated and dismissal of the information inappropriate. Consequently, the Counts I-IV
should be reinstated and defendant ordered to trial.
(A) The Magistrate Failed to Apply the Proper Evidentiary and Legal
Standards in Assessing the Sufficiency ofthe Preliminary Hearing Evidence.
The standards governing preliminary hearings are well-established. In felony cases,
the prosecution must present sufficient evidence at a preliminary hearing to establish
"probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and the defendant has
committed it." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(h)(1) {Addendum A). Here, this means probable cause

8

to believe that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed, in a drug free zone, the
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia found in his bedroom on August 8 (Counts I & II),
and that he knowingly and intentionally used the methamphetamine and morphine found in
his urine on August 20 (Counts III & IV). See

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-8a-l(2)(a) (1999)

(recognizing that when misdemeanors are charged in a felony information, "the defendant
is afforded a preliminary hearing" on all offenses) {Addendum A). See also UTAH CODE
ANN.

§ 58-37-8 (2002) (delineating elements of felony possession); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-

37a-5 (2002) (delineating elements of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia); and
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-2(dd) (2002) (defining "possession"to include constructive

possession and "use" to include injection and consumption) {Addendum A).
Probable cause is "more than bare suspicion." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175 (1949). On the other hand, probable cause to support a bindover "'need not be
capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Schroyer,
2002 UT 26, % 11, 44 P.3d 730 (quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 15, 20 P.3d 300).
Instead, the quantum of evidence necessary for bindover is equivalent to that required for
arrest: "believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id. Accord Brinegar,
338 U.S. at 1310 ("[t]he substance of all definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground
for belief of guilt").
In assessing the sufficiency of preliminary hearing evidence, a magistrate must view
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences based on that evidence in the light most
favorable to the information. See Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10 (citing State v. Talbot, 972

9

P.2d 435,437-38 (Utah 1998)); Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10. Even if an innocent explanation for
the defendant's conduct might exist, "it not necessary that all legitimate reasons be absent
before [the magistrate] finds probable cause." State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531,535 (Utah 1994)
(explaining probable cause in context of police officer's decision to search). At the
preliminary hearing stage, "all that the State must do is establish that its theory [of
culpability] is reasonable." Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 12 (citing Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20).
Consequently, "'[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should
bind the defendant over for trial.'" Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10 (quoting Talbot, 972 P.3d
at 437)). Here, the magistrate failed to properly apply these standards.
The magistrate failed to view the preliminary evidence, and draw reasonable factual
inferences based on that evidence, in favor of the information. Instead, the magistrate
concluded that there was no evidence to show that "defendant was engaged in the criminal
enterprise of possession or use of a controlled substance," and "no evidence showing that he
was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug paraphernalia" (R.
26) {Addendum B). The magistrate's assessment is contrary to the record evidence.
The undisputed testimony established:
(1) defendant was a divorced father who resided in a three-bedroom trailer,
within 1000 feet of a high school (R. 39: 8, 12-13, 21-22,25, 32);
(2) defendant occupied the master bedroom (R. 39: 13, 26-27, 32);
(3) defendant's son and the son's friend occupied the two other bedrooms;
neither were present when the trailer was searched (R. 13, 26-27, 32);

10

(4) with defendant's permission, his ex-wife was temporarily living with their
son in the son's bedroom for the last five to seven days and was present when
the police conducted their search (R. 39: 13);
(5) on August 7, defendant spent the night at the trailer and left around 6:30
p.m. on August 8; he was not present when the search began three hours later
(R.39: 13,16,22,31);
(6) when defendant left on August 8, he did not lock his bedroom door and left
numerous personal items in the bedroom, including clothing, business receipts,
his Day Planner, and his Social Security card (R. 39: 13, 27, 33-34);
(7) the police discovered items containing drug residue and drug paraphernalia
in the son's and his son's friend's bedrooms and in the trailer's common
bathroom (R. 39: 13-14, 18-20, 27-28);7
(8) the police discovered spoons containing methamphetamine residue in
defendant's bedroom on his night stand and in the cubby hold of the
headboard or in a nearby dresser drawer (R. 39: 12,19-20, 31);
(9) the police discovered syringes containing methamphetamine residue in
defendant's bedroom (R. 39: 13-14, 20);
(10) the police discovered Ziplock bags containing traces of methamphetamine
in defendant's bedroom (id.);
(11) the police discovered sets of scales, a gauge to test the scales, propane
torches, and lighters in defendant's bedroom (R. 39: 13-14);
(12) on August 20, twelve days after the search, the police arrested defendant
at the same trailer after he locked himself in the master bedroom to avoid arrest
(R. 39: 35-36,40-42);
(13) the same day, defendant voluntarily provided a urine specimen which
tested positive for methamphetamine and morphine (R. 39: 43);
(14) when informed of the positive urine test, defendant claimed that he had
a prescription for Lortab (morphine) at home (R. 39: 45);

7

Exactly what was found in the other bedrooms or bathroom was not disclosed at
the preliminary hearing since defendant was not charged with possession of those items.
11

(15) a probation officer who participated in the August 8th search saw
prescription bottles with defendant's name in defendant's bedroom; one of the
prescriptions was possibly for Lortab or some other narcotic (R. 39: 33-34);
Contrary to the magistrate's conclusion (R. 26) (Addendum 2?), this evidence, together with
its reasonable inferences, was more than ample to establish probable cause that defendant
illegally possessed methamphetamine in a drug free zone and illegally possessed drug
paraphernalia on August 8 (Counts I & II), and that he illegally possessed or used
methamphetamine and morphine on or about August 20 (Counts III & IV),
But in addition, the preliminary hearing evidence established:
(16) in August 2002, defendant was on probation for illegal drug usage and
sales (R. 39: 30);
(17) in August 2002, the trailer was listed as defendant's legal residence with
Adult Probation and Parole (R. 39: 25);
(18) the drugs and paraphernalia found in defendant's bedroom were not only
consistent with personal drug usage, but also with illegal drug sales (R. 39:1314,27-28);
(19) defendant's Day Planner, discovered on his bed or dresser, contained his
Social Security card together with "pay" sheets, listing names and dollar
amounts in columns, consistent with "billing" systems used in illegal drug
sales (R. 39: 28-29);
(20) a police officer who lived across the street from defendant observed shortterm traffic at the trailer indicative of illegal drug sales (R. 39: 9).
Contrary to the magistrate's refusal to bind over, this evidence further supports probable
cause to believe that defendant committed the possession crimes charged.
The magistrate's erroneous conclusion that the evidence was insufficient arose from
his over-reliance on case law in which possession convictions were reversed for insufficient

12

evidence (R. 42-54). But a finding of probable cause to support bind over "'need not be
capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5" Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,
\ 11 (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 15). For unlike conviction, bindover is warranted even
when the facts presented at a preliminary hearing "give rise to two alternative inferences"
and only one supports probable cause. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20. Accord State v. Lee, 863
P.2d 49, 58 n.13 (Utah App. 1993) (distinguishing high level of proof necessary for
possession conviction from minimal evidence necessary to es\a\Ais\iprobable cause to arrest
for possession). As long as the State's theory of culpability is reasonable, the preliminary
hearing magistrate is obligated to accept it. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ^ 10 & 12 (citing
Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38, and Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 20). Here, the State's theory of
possession for Counts I-IV was eminently reasonable and, consequently, the magistrate was
legally mandated to bind over. See id.
(B) The Magistrate Failed to Properly Interpret the Legal Requirements of
Possession.
At the root of the magistrate's failure to bind over was his misinterpretation of the
legal requirements for possession. According to the magistrate, "you've got [to have] the
ability to reach out and touch something if you're gonna [sic] be guilty of possession" and,
therefore, the magistrate could see no legal basis to infer possession if "you're miles away"
(R. 39: 74). This is not a correct statement of the law.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) defines possession to include "joint or individual
ownership, control, occupancy," including joint or individual "injection and consumption"
if the joint usage or control was knowing or the controlled substance "found in a place or
13

under circumstances indicating that the [defendant] had the ability and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over it." See Addendum A. Thus, under Utah law,
[ajctual physical possession is not a required element of the crime of
possession of a controlled substance. A finding of constructive possession by
the defendant will satisfy the possession element. To prove that a defendant
was in knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance, the
prosecution need only establish that the produced contraband was found in a
place or under circumstances indicating that the accused had the ability and the
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. The mere occupancy of a
portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot, without more, support
a finding its knowing and intentional possession by the accused. There must
be some additional nexus between the accused and the contraband to show that
the accused had the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over
it.
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987) (footnotes omitted, but citing State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) and State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981)). The
requisite nexus requires more than merely establishing that a defendant knew "of the
whereabouts of illicit drugs and.. might even have access to them;" it requires evidence to
support the inference that the defendant had the "intent to make use of that knowledge and
ability." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
"A determination of constructive possession depends on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132. Factors generally include, but are
not limited to:
(1) who has ownership and/or occupies the premises where the drugs were found;
(2) if ownership or occupancy is not exclusive, who has control over the
specific area where the drugs were found;
(3) if ownership or occupancy is not exclusive, the relationship between any
occupants of the premises;
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(4) whether the drugs were in plain or open view;
(5) the defendant's access to the place where the drugs are found;
(6) the proximity of the defendant to the drugs when discovered;
(7) the proximity of personal items of the defendant to the drugs;
(8) the nature and location of drug paraphernalia capable of facilitating the use
or distribution of the drugs;
(9) the presence of "grow books" or other items evidencing an intent to use or
distribute the drugs;
(10) evidence that defendant used part of the drugs found, either alone or with
others;
(11) evidence that defendant has previously or is presently using or selling
drugs;
(12) competent evidence of an informant's tip concerning defendant's nexus
to the drugs;
(13) incriminating statements by the defendant or any other occupant of the
premises;
See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20; State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263-1264 (Utah 1983);
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah App. 1991); and State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561,
570-74 (Utah App. 1991). Accord State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, fl[ 14-15, 985 P.2d 911
(cautioning that the list of factors are not "legal elements" and should not be viewed as
"universally pertinent" or "exhaustive," but are simply relevant considerations).
Here, the evidence established that defendant was a convicted drug user and
distributer and presently on supervised probation. Drug sales appeared to be continuing at
his residence, which he shared with his son and a son's friend. Five to seven days
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previously, he permitted his ex-wife to temporarily move in with their son. Defendant was
the only occupant of the master bedroom and, on August 7, had spent the night there and had
left on August 8 just three hours prior to the search.

Spoons and syringes with

methamphetamine residue were found in the defendant's bedroom next to defendant's bed
and/or in the bed's headboard.

Ziplock bags with traces of methamphetamine were

discovered in the same room, together with numerous other items indicative of drug usage
and sales, including scales, a calibration gauge for the scales, propane torches, lighters, and
"pay sheets." The "pay sheets" were in defendant's Day Planner which also contained his
Social Security card. See Facts, supra at 4-6 & 10-12.
On August 20, twelve days after the search, defendant locked himself in the same
bedroom to avoid arrest. Urine analysis revealed that he had recently injected or otherwise
consumed methamphetamine and morphine. See id.
In sum, even though defendant was not present when drugs and paraphernalia were
discovered in his home, the preliminary hearing evidence provides an abundant basis from
which to infer that defendant not only knew that drugs and drug paraphernalia were in his
bedroom, but that he had the "intent to make use of that knowledge and ability" to possess
those items. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Moreover, based on the used spoons and syringes
found in his bedroom on August 8, it is "believable" that he intentionally injected or
consumed the drugs found in his urine on August 20. Because there was a factual basis to
support each charge, the magistrate erred in refusing to bind over Counts I-IV.
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(C) The Magistrate Failed to Distinguish Between the A ugustffhand A ugust
2ffh Charges.
Despite the fact that the magistrate clearly dismissed Counts I-IV of the information,
the basis for the ruling - that there was insufficient evidence defendant possessed the drugs
and paraphernalia found in his room when he was "miles away" - only factually relates to
the August 8th charges (Count I & II). See Magistrate's Oral Ruling (R. 60-74); Order of
Dismissal (R. 25-27, 29-30) (Addendum B). The ruling provides no factual or legal
explanation for the refusal to bind over Counts III-IV, both of which were based on
defendant's positive urine analysis on August 20. See id.
Because the preliminary hearing evidence established a reasonable basisfromwhich
to infer that defendant had knowingly used methamphetamine and morphine on or about
August 20, Count III & IV should have been bound over. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-372(dd) (defining "possession or use" to include consumption and injection of a controlled
substance). See also Subsection (B), supra. Consequently, the magistrate's blanket dismissal
was erroneous. See Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10 (quoting Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38, a
defendant should be bound over "'unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the prosecution's claim'").
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CONCLUSION
The order dismissing the information should be reversed and the case remanded for
entry of an order binding defendant over for trial on Counts I-IV.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &d

day of February, 2003.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General-^

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

ule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest,
,e defendant shall appear before the court as directed in the
immons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest
ith or without a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken
i the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an
iformation has not been filed, one shall befiledwithout delay
sfore the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where
le offense was committed the person arrested shall without
nnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime
r
as committed and shall be taken before the proper magis*
rate under these rules.
(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly
eturned to the county and the charge against the defendant is
misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be
ntered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the
>erson arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail,
/aive trial in the district in which the information is pending*
nd consent to disposition of the case in the county in which
he person was arrested, is held, or is present.
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of
he court in which the information is pending shall transmit
he papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the clerk of
,he court for the county in which the defendant is arrested,
leld, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that
ssued the warrant.
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a
misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be
entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), &e
defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a
magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination ot
bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without
bail under Section 77-20-1.
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense, with the record made of the proceeding8
before the magistrate.
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense
jharged shall, upon the defendant's first appearance, inform
jie defendant:
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and
Ornish a copy;
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of
be information and how to obtain them;
(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed
}y the court without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the statements the defendant does make may
?e used against the defendant in a court of law.
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information
mder paragraph (d) and before proceeding further, allow the
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel
uid shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney by any
-easonable means, without delay and without fee.
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor,
he magistrate shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by
he magistrate as provided by law.
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date
nay not be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall
>e held under these rules and law applicable to criminal cases.
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant
jhall be advised of the right to a preliminary examination. If
he defendant waives the right to a preliminary examination,
md the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall
>rder the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.

(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be held within a reasonable time,
but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for
the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant
is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the
magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination
may not be held if the defendant is indicted.
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to
criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of
proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of
the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also
cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that
the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order, in
writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the
ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not
properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe
that the crime charged has been committed or that the
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon
request of either party, may exclude witnesses from the
courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse with
each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On
the request of either party, the magistrate may order all
spectators to be excluded from the courtroom.
(j)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to
the district court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a
bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the district
court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings
before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any
typewritten transcript.
(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody
of the sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate
commitment order.
(k)(l) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that
any material witness in a pending case will not appear and
testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond
with or without sureties and in a sum considered adequate for
the appearance of the witness.
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the
clerk of the court, the magistrate may commit the witness to
jail until the witness complies or is otherwise legally discharged.
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the
witness may be examined and cross-examined before the
magistrate in the presence of the defendant and the testimony
shall be recorded. The witness shall then be discharged.
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any
subsequent hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the
recorded testimony may be used at the hearing or trial in lieu
of the personal testimony of the witness.
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58-37-2

(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled
substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a
controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown
to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use,
possession, or control of any substances with knowledge
that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it.

38-37-7. Labeling and packaging controlled substance.
(DA person licensed pursuant to this act may not distribute a controlled substance unless it is packaged and labeled in
compliance with the requirements of Section 305 of the
Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970.
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose of filling
a prescription shall alter, deface, or remove any label affixed
by the manufacturer.
(3) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any controlled substance on a prescnption issued by a practitioner, he
shall affix to the container in which the substance is sold or
dispensed:
(a) a label showing his own name, address, and registry
number, or the name, address, and registry number of the
pharmacist or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully
acting;
(b) the prescription number, the name of the patient, or
if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner of the
animal and the species of the animal;
(c) the name of the practitioner by whom the prescription was written;
(d) any directions stated on the prescription; and
(e) any directions required by rules and regulations
promulgated by the department.
(4) A person may not alter the face or remove any label so
long as any of the original contents remain.
(5j (a) An individual to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed
by a practitioner and the owner of any animal for which
any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or
dispensed by a veterinarian may lawfully possess it only
in the container in which it was delivered to him by the
person selling or dispensing it.
(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the person being prosecuted produces in court a
valid prescription for the controlled substance or the
original container with the label attached.
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions that are undertaken in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa)
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule Vis guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of
Subsection (lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if
the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or
in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(lXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly

from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authonzed by
this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as denned in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person, that person
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
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ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa)
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4XaXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4XaXi) through
(viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger
than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would
otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
established would have been less than a first degree
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted
under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
^ It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4Xa^
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred
was as described in Subsection (4Ka).
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(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of another state for the same
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character
of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction
and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this
section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
legitimate scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid,
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
IMS

58-37-15. Burden of proof in proceedings on violations
— Enforcement officers exempt from liability.
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption
or exception set forth in this act in any complaint, information,
indictment or other pleading or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act, and the burden of proof of any
exemption or exception is upon the person claiming its benefit.
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly authorized
holder of an appropriate license, registration, order form, or
prescription issued under this act, he shall be presumed not to
be the holder of a license, registration, order form, or prescription, and the burden of proof is upon him to rebut the
presumption.
(3) No liability shall be imposed upon any duly authorized
state or federal officer engaged in the enforcement of this act
who is engaged in the enforcement of any law, municipal
ordinance, or regulation relating to controlled substances.
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58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any
drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body in violation of this act. Any person who violates
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three
years or more younger than the person making the delivery is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
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77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be
charged in the same indictment or information if each offense
is a separate count and if the offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or
plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing
with respect to both the misdemeanor and felony offenses.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged to have
participated in the same act or conduct or in the same
criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more
counts together or separately and all of the defendants
need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged
with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the
court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders
separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or
informations or both to be tried together if the offenses,
and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have
been joined in a single indictment or information.
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an
indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or
provide other relief as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least
five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant
for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he
intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
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Addendum B

DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642

CO^NTY^TAM
(J£2J*J*XF\

Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135
1i

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER ON PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Assigned Judge David L. Mower

GARY SORENSEN,
Defendant.

A Preliminary Examination was conducted in this case on September 25, 2002. During
the examination the following facts were shown.

Findings of Fact
1.

The defendant was and is currently on probation and is being supervised by the
Utah Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole.

2.

There is a single family residence located in the Sanpete County, Utah.

3.

A Search Warrant was issued.

4.

On August 8,2002 several officers went to the residence to execute the search
warrant.

5.

The warrant was executed and the residence was searched.
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The defendant was not there.

7.

The following items were found in a bedroom
a.

A social security card in the name of the defendant.

b.

A calendar or day-planner bearing the name of the defendant.

c.

Men's clothing and other items generally found in a man's bedroom.

8.

Items of drug paraphernalia were found in the same bedroom.

9.

One of the searching officers had a conversation with a female person who was
present and identified as the defendant's ex-wife. She said that the defendant was
living in the residence and had spent the previous night there.

10.

The items of paraphernalia were tested and found to contain residue of
methamphetamine, a controlled substance.

Analysis
The charge pending against the defendant is: ILLEGAL POSSESSION/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3RD Degree felony.
There was no evidence to show that the defendant was engaged in the criminal enterprise
of possession or use of a controlled substance. The defendant made no incriminating statements.
He was not close to the drugs because he was not present. There was no evidence showing that he
was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the drug paraphernalia.

ORDER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, Case number ? 2 * ^ W % Page -3Conclusion
The evidence was not sufficient to justify a bind over. Consequently, the charge against
the defendant is dismissed.
Date

n r

_, 2002

DavicfL. Mower
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On October 3 D , 2002 a copy of this ORDER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
was sent by M=first- class mail, P=Clerk's office pickup box, F=Fax to:
Addressee

Method

Addressee

Randy M. Kennard
Deputy Sanpete County Attorney
160 North Main, Suite 306
Manti, UT 84642

M

Shelden R. Carter
HARRIS & CARTER
3325 No University, Suite 200
Provo. UT
I IT 84604-4438
Provo,

Method
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357
Sanpete County Attorney
RANDY M. KENNARD #7907
Deputy Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main - Suite 306
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435) 835-6381
Facsimile: (435)835-6383
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]

Vs.

>

DISMISSAL ORDER

GARY SORENSEN,

>

Criminal No. 021600151

Defendant.

)

This matter having come before the Court for a review hearing on the 6th day of November
2002; the Court having previously entered it's Order on Preliminary Examination" dated October 29,
2002, which dismissed Count's I through IV of the Information; Randy M. Kennard appearing as
counsel for the Plaintiff; Plaintiff having made a motion in open Court to dismiss with prejudice the
remaining Count V of the Information, Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B
Misdemeanor; the Court having found that a dismissal of the remaining charge is reasonable under the
circumstances to facilitate Plaintiffs stated intention to pursue an appeal of rightfromthe Court's
previous Order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Information;
NOW THEREFORE, Count V of the Information, Interference with an Arresting Officer, a
Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Dismissal Order
State of Utah vs Sorensen
Criminal No 021600151
Page 2

DATED this

dax.oiN.ovember 2002.

BY THE COURT:

^

DAVID L.MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

G CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Dismissal
Order to the defendant's attorney, Sheldon Carter at 3325 No. University Ave, Suite 200, Provo,
Utah 84604-4438 postage prepaid this _^fday of November 2002.

By:

